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Lawrence Lessig
Along one front of the battle between Critical Legal scholars1 and
others is a struggle over the nature of social transformation, a debate over
the ease with which a society should be able to change itself from what it
is to something else. On one side of this debate, the radical "crits" cham-
pion "plasticity, ' 2 the claim that social and political structures should be
easily transformed;' on the other, opponents argue that some constituting
structures (at least) must remain rigid, removed from the agenda of ordi-
nary political action." Between these two extremes stands an apparently
wide gulf, unbridged, and perhaps unbridgeable, by theorists of either
side.
But it is just not clear how wide a gap this gulf really is, or how radi-
cally different we should consider the "radicals" to be. For much of the
debate over social transformation appears to rest upon a confusion, engen-
dered in part by an ambiguity in the meaning of "transformation" itself.
This ambiguity leads rivals to overstate their disagreements, obscuring
much of what may be in common among them. By examining the works
of two of these rivals-Bruce Ackerman 5 and Roberto Unger 6-this Note
1. For a helpful summary of "the movement's" contributions, see M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). See also A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J.
461 (1984).
2. One sense of "plasticity" is the capacity of social structures, and therefore social worlds, to be
formed and reformed; this is the sense of "constructivism" discussed below. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 29-37. Another sense, that emphasized by this Note, focuses not on the capacity of social
structures to be formed or reformed, but on the ease with which they can be formed and reformed. See
infra text accompanying notes 38-50.
3. As Roberto Unger claims, "[tihe revolutionary ideologies of liberalism, socialism, and commu-
nism all seek to develop forms of empowerment through the subversion of rigid roles and hierarchies
and through the subjection of social life to the transforming will." R. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY:
ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 296 (1987)
[hereinafter FALSE NECESSITY]. For an argument by a non-Crit suggesting that existing constitutional
structures are more plastic than we think, see Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitu-
tion Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988).
4. Rather than making constitutional structures universally more plastic, Bruce Ackerman sug-
gests that the failure of the modem lawyer is her refusal to distinguish between ordinary and ex-
traordinary structure-transforming action, "between the constitutional conclusions reached by a mobil-
ized citizenry and the ordinary outcomes of normal politics." Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures:
Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1035 (1984).
5. The primary works by Ackerman addressed in this Note include B. ACKERMAN, DISCOVERING
THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming) [hereinafter DISCOVERING]; B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN LAW (1984) [hereinafter RECONSTRUCTING]; B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE
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aims to erase this confusion, and thereby draw together the opposing
sides.
The confusion is undone by a theory of social meaning, held in common
between these two rivals. With this theory, two types of "transformation"
will be distinguished, the case for plasticity turning upon which "transfor-
mation" is at issue. As this Note argues, under one conception, both Ack-
erman and Unger can accept plasticity; under the other, with differing
emphases, both must caution against its unconditioned embrace. This dif-
fering emphasis, then, maps the distance between these two rivals. How-
ever wide the scope, this Note argues it is far more narrow than the rheto-
ric suggests. Once we understand what unites these rivals, the differences
that remain no longer overwhelm.
I. COMMON GROUND
Before we can explore the differences dividing Unger and Ackerman,
we must first understand the common ground they share.' Despite their
apparent conflict, a philosophical theory9 unites Ackerman and Unger, a
theory touching the modalities of social meaning,'" the necessary and pos-
LIBERAL STATE (1980) [hereinafter SOCIAL JUSTICE]; B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1977) [hereinafter PROPERTY]; Ackerman, supra note 4.
6. This Note focuses primarily on Unger's more recent works, including R. UNGER, THE CRITI-
CAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986) [hereinafter CRITICAL]; R. UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON
PERSONALITY (1984) [hereinafter PASSION]; R. UNGER, POLITICS, A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SO-
CIAL THEORY (3 volumes, including SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK (1987) [herein-
after SOCIAL THEORY], FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, PLSICITY INTO POWER (1987) [hereinaf-
ter PLASTICITY]). As many have noted, these works rely upon a philosophy fundamentally different
from Unger's earlier works, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975), and LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
(1976). E.g., Collins, Roberto Unger and the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 14 J.L. & SOC'Y 387,
395 (1987) (noting change in epistemological assumptions); West, CLS and a Liberal Critic, 97 YALE
L.J. 757, 758 (1988) (same); Boyle, Modernist Social Theory: Roberto Unger's Passion (Book Re-
view), 98 HARV. L. REV. 1066, 1079 (1985) (same); Simon, Social Theory and Political Practice:
Unger's Brazilian Journalism, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 832, 866 (1987) (noting change in philosophical
approach). Unger himself notes the shift, KNOWLEDGE AND POLrrICS 337-41 (1984). But despite this
warning, some have missed the shift. See, e.g., Ewald, Unger's Philosophy: A Critical Legal Study, 97
YALE L.J. 665, 668, 673 n.38, 729 (1988) (critiquing range of Unger's work as if no shift had
occurred); Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical Legal
Scholarship, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1679 n.70 (1982) (earlier work "leads into" the later);
Pateman, Book Review, 96 ETHICS 422, 422 (1986) (linking earlier work and PASSION).
7. For discussions of their rivalry, see Cohen, High-Tech Justice, 38 STAN. L. REV. 919, 924
(1986) (reviewing B. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW); Hutchinson, From Cultural
Construction to Historical Deconstruction, 94 YALE L.J. 209, 214, 235 n.140 (1984) (reviewing J.B.
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING); Teachout, Worlds Beyond Theory, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 849, 877-78 (1985) (reviewing same).
8. It is the work of Renford Bambrough which motivates this search for common ground between
these combatants. As Bambrough suggests, it is a "necessary truth that even a conflict of opinions can
be found only where there is a community of understanding." Bambrough, The Scope of Reason: An
Epistle to the Persians, in OBJECTIVITY AND CULTURAL DIVERGENCE 195, 198 (S.C. Brown ed.
1984).
9. For the purposes of this Note, a question or theory is considered "philosophical" if it engages
questions of epistemology or metaphysics. See P. WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE 7 (1958);
see also Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613, 616 (1987) (discussing relationship of law
to philosophy).
10. Throughout this Note, "social meaning" refers to the contextual meaning of the full range of
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sible of social life. Two dimensions of this theory are important for the
argument of this Note, "contextuality""1 and "constructivism."" 2 In the
sections that follow, these dimensions are sketched."
A. Contextuality
It is commonplace that a sentence has meaning by virtue of its use
within a context of understanding or expectation,' 4 and a small step from
social artifacts, conveyed by their role in social life. This population includes obvious meaning-
artifacts, such as language and gesture, as well as others less obvious, such as legal concepts, modes of
production, institutions, and governments. See infra note 15 (discussing tokens).
11. Contextuality is a motif running through a wide range of theorists, both in philosophy, see
generally R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); P. WINCH, supra note 9; L.
WrrrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY (D. Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1979); L. WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 2d ed. 1958); L. WrrrGENsTEIN, ZEr-
TEL (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 2d ed. 1981), and social and legal theory, see generally C. GEERTZ,
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES (1973); C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE (1983); C. TAYLOR,
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES (1985); Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 n.7 (1983) (discussing thick contextuality of moral
discourse); Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745 (1982) (discussing role of
interpretative community in anchoring objective interpretation).
While Unger distinguishes his position from Wittgenstein's, see PASSION, supra note 6, at 11;
SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 226, his discalmer goes to the possibility of constructivism, rather
than the fact of contextuality, and is in any case a misreading of Wittgenstein. See S. LOVIBOND,
REALISM AND IMAGINATION IN ETHICS 125-28 (1983) (arguing Wittgensteinian contextualism al-
lows possibility of construction and critique); Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L.
REV. 679, 688 (1986) (implying same).
12. Like contextuality, constructivism refers to no school in particular, but rather to a theme
regarding the nature of social meaning. That our social world is constructed is not a new idea. For its
chief modern pronouncement, see P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY 49 (1967) ("While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more significant to say
that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that man produces himself."). See also D.
BLOOR, WITTGENSTEIN: A SOCIAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (1983); C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRE-
TATION OF CULTURES, supra note 11, at 5 ("[M]an is an animal suspended in webs of significance
he himself has spun. . . ."); N. GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 7 (1978) ("With false hope
of a firm foundation gone, with the world displaced by worlds that are but versions, with substance
dissolved into function, and with the given acknowledged as taken, we face the questions how worlds
are made, tested, and known."); R. RORTY, supra note 11, at xxxix ("Can we see ourselves as never
encountering reality except under a chosen description . . . making worlds rather than finding
them?"); J.B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING 273 (1984) ("[The law is an] open
hearing in which one point of view, one construction of language and reality, is tested against an-
other."); B. WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 207-19 (1956); Cornell, supra note 11,
at 690-91 (Wittgenstein perceiving social reality as constituted by language); Cover, supra note 11;
Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY
128, 128 (D. Hymes ed. 1964).
13. While the picture which will emerge is of necessity only a caricature of a theory far more
complex, this sketch will suffice for the arguments that follow. The theory of meaning outlined below
simplifies along at least two dimensions. First, the theory ignores the role of the interpreter; second, it
ignores problems of indeterminacy in meaning. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 1-17,
147-73 (1980). These issues are crucial to any fully developed understanding of meaning, but must be
bypassed for the purposes of this Note.
14. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 11, at 43 & passim;
C. TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES
33-34 (1985) ("[Viocabulary . . . is grounded in the shape of social practice . . . and would not
make sense . . . where this range of social practices did not exist."); Stroup, Law and Language:
Cardozo'sJurisprudence and Wittgenstein's Philosophy, 18 VAL U.L. REv. 331, 350 (1984) ("Lan-
guage, then, derives its meaning from its use in a context, in concrete situations.").
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this commonplace to the more general proposition that tokens15 of mean-
ing have meaning only by virtue of contexts or structures background.' 6
Meaning is a function of both token and context.' 7 Two aspects of this
"contextuality" are relevant to this Note.
The first aspect is the core nature of "context" itself. A context is com-
posed of structures of understanding,"" a scaffolding within which con-
cepts exist.' 9 Meaning is conditioned upon context, and thus conditioned2"
upon the structures that compose this context. These structures, often in-
visible to ordinary analysis,2" include the full range of patterned expecta-
tions and understandings, from styles of fashion, to norms of etiquette, to
conventions of speech, to rules of law.2 2 They infect every activity, "se-
crete"2 their own norms. Together they make up the status quo, 2 to be
justified if the status quo is to be justified.25 Contextuality teaches us to
15. "Token" refers to a symbol of meaning: a statement, a wink, an institution, a practice, an
action, an inaction. Under this broad understanding, then, token can refer either to the literal words of
a text, for example, or, in the context of a statute, to the application of those words in the particular
context. This distinction, between the words and their application, will be crucial below. See infra
note 78 and accompanying text.
16. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 4. Following Unger, this Note does not distinguish
between 'context,' 'structure,' and 'framework.' Id. at 3.
17. "[Mleaning does not reside simply in the words of a text but is a product of linguistic and
cultural understandings and experiences . . .." R. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence 138
(1988) (unpublished manuscript) (footnote omitted). For a discussion of context-dependent intellectual
movements, see Boyle, supra note 6, at 1067 n.4.
18. A context includes "[tihe institutional and imaginative frameworks of social life [that] supply
the basis on which people define and reconcile interests, identify and solve problems." SOCIAL THE-
ORY, supra note 6, at 4. See also id. at 3 (defining context), 151 (same); FALSE NECESSITY, sUpra
note 3, at 58-61 (same). It comprises the "stock forms of legal, moral, and ideological argument," id.
at 100, as well as other noninstitutional or imaginative components, see id. at 100, including "possible
and desirable forms of human association . . . ." Id. at 58. It is reproduced in the "banal activities of
daily life," see SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 152, and exists "in the sense that people cannot
easily disturb it in the course of their ordinary activities." FALSE NECEssrrY, supra note 3, at 61.
19. "'It is as if our concepts involved a scaffolding of facts.'" L. WITTGENSTEIN, ZErIrEL, supra
note 11, at T 350.
20. See SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 19.
21. "The task, then, is to deny any fundamental power structure the priceless advantage of invisi-
bility," SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 19, an invisibility issuing from the blindness to the condi-
tional nature of social meaning. Cf B. WHORF, supra note 12, at 211 ("[T]he phenomena of a
language are to its own speakers largely of a background character and so are outside ...critical
consciousness and control . . ").
22. See, e.g., Cover, supra note 11, at 4 ("We inhabit a nomos-a normative universe. We con-
stantly create and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and void.").
23. C. TAYLOR, Neutrality in Political Science, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES,
supra note 11, at 90.
24. For an especially sensitive analysis of the place of the status quo in legal thinking, see Sun-
stein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987).
25. See RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 5, at 54 ("lawyer cannot simply assume the legitimacy of
the ongoing structure of activities"); Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NoMoS XXII:
PROPERTY 351, 370 (J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds. 1980) (increasing need for courts to ex-
amine ideals of status quo); Cole, Against Literalism, 40 STAN. L. REV. 545, 558 (1988) (reviewing
J.B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow) ("CLS aims to undermine legal doctrine in order to reveal its ideolog-




focus upon these structures, to understand their nature so as to understand
the nature of the meaning they permit.2"
The second aspect of contextuality relevant to this Note is the method
of analysis contextuality suggests. Since meaning is a function of both to-
ken and context,27 an analysis of meaning must include an account of
each. A change in either can affect meaning; therefore, the meaning of a
token is not necessarily preserved simply by keeping the token unchanged.
Between two moments of time, contextuality tutors us to track both the
change in the token and the change in the context, so as to track the
change in meaning.
Ackerman and Unger embrace both aspects of contextuality, and are
guided by contextuality throughout their work.2 Contextuality is the first
aspect of a theory of meaning the rivals share.
B. Constructivism
Where contextuality identifies the components of social meaning, con-
structivism 29 teaches that each element is (at least potentially) under social
control: We can change both the tokens of social meaning and the struc-
tures that give these tokens their meaning. No structure or routine of so-
cial life is either natural or necessary;30 each is an artifact, 1 socially cre-
26. See Cornell, supra note 11, at 685 ("[M]eaning is revealed in context but not absolutely
determined by it."); Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1332-39 (1982) ("Interpreters are
constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and not possible to do, what is and is not a
reasonable thing to say, and what will and will not be heard as evidence in a given enterprise
27. As Posner writes, "A normal English speaker does not interpret a message merely by consult-
ing the dictionary definitions of each word . . . . He consults the totality of his relevant experience,
which. . . includes. . . social practices. . . . Meaning depends on context as well as semantics." R.
Posner, supra note 17, at 120.
28. "The contextual quality of thought is a brute fact." SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 19.
"Al[t]hough we can transcend our contexts, we cannot pursue any of our ordinary human concerns
outside a context." FALSE NEcEssrrY, supra note 3, at 433. Any meaningful activity or thought is
contextual; context is enabling, since constituting all meaningful human activity, but also constraining.
PASSION, supra note 6, at 4.
In RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW, Ackerman develops a structural account of the facts of legal
disputes, see RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 5, at 29, 46-47, aiming thereby to "explicate[] the inter-
pretative frameworks. . . . [in] American legal culture." Id. at 53 n.9. In PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE CONSTITUTION, by outlining two such interpretative frameworks, Ackerman untangles the con-
fusion in compensation clause cases. PROPERTY, supra note 5, at 5, 175-76. See also Ackerman, The
Structure of Subchapter C: An Anthropological Comment, 87 YALE L.J. 436 (1977) (discussing role
of interpretative structures in understanding content of statutory code); cf Cohen, supra note 7, at
924 ("At first blush, Ackerman's structural account sounds a little like the 'deviationist doctrine' of
the critical legal studies movement, which 'commits itself to integrate into standard doctrinal argument
the explicit controversy over the right and feasible structure of society, over what the relations among
people should be like in the different areas of social activity.'") (quoting Unger, The Critical Legal
Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 578 (1983)).
29. Contextuality by itself does not imply constructivism. Other theories have identified structures
guiding social life and evolution without suggesting these structures were amenable to human control.
Unger identifies two, which he calls naturalism and deep structure (or deep logic) theories. See PAS-
SION, supra note 6, at 5-6; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 23-24, 84-87 (discussing naturalism),
88-96 (discussing deep structure theories).
30. See SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 164 (on naturalness of family); S. LOVIBOND, supra
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ated and socially changed. No superstructure guides social evolution, or at
least none that we could not ultimately transform. 2
To deny constructivism is to betray what Unger calls "false necessity."
False necessity is "the ease with which we mistake the constraints im-
posed by a particular formative context of social life for the inherently
psychological, organizational, and economic imperatives of society."33 By
revealing the nature of context and constraint,"' constructivism uncovers
the means by which constraint is remade and context overcome. 35
The theme of constructivism, then, is the artificial, socially-made, and
possible of social life.36 Both Ackerman and Unger embrace constructiv-
ism,"7 however differently they may develop it.
note 11, at 118 (organic connection of language with culture); id. at 117 (Wittgensteinian conception
means linguistic world not natural phenomenon, but "a product of our own actions"); id. at 119
(subject only to the constraint of community, "nothing constrains our choice of ... what linguistic
systems to maintain"); SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 145 ("They want to deprive these
frameworks or contexts of their aura of higher necessity or authority. Above all, they want to affirm
that things can be otherwise.").
31. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 61 ("[Contexts] are artifacts, and makeshift ones at
that, but they are not just factitious entities that cease to exist as soon as people stop taking them
seriously."); see also SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 1 (modern social thought viewing society as
human artifact); J.B. WHrrE, supra note 12, at 26 (same); Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Compla-
cency, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 693 (1987) ("Our social world is made, not given."); cf J.B. WHITE,
HERACLEs' Bow 103 (1985) ("artificial" means only that structures are constructed, not that they are
unreal).
32. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 4, 65-66.
33. PASSION, supra note 6, at 14. Marx spoke of something similar:
Hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves,
about what they are and what they ought to be. They have arranged their relationships ac-
cording to their ideas of God, of normal man, etc. The phantoms of their brains have got out of
their hands. They, the creators, have bowed down before their creations. Let us liberate them
from the chimeras, the ideas, dogmas, imaginary beings under the yoke of which they are
pining away.
K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE GERMAN IDEALOGY 37 (Lawrence & Wishart trans. 2d ed. 1974).
34. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 254-55 (discussing the source of conceptions of neces-
sity). However, to deny that constraints are inherent in a particular form of life is not to deny that
there are constraints on social life. See, e.g., id. at 195.
35. But that contexts and constraint can be remade does not mean that they can be changed all at
once. "Inevitably, we must accept a conservative presumption." PASSION, supra note 6, at 42. Revolu-
tionary reform is necessarily conservative, S. LovIBOND, supra note 11, at 109 ("[Ilf we throw out too
much of our intellectual furniture at once, we cease to have a habitable world-view . . ."), taking
something as given, SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 18, changing structures only piece by piece. See
id. at 4, 158; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 4, 559 (only if proceed step by step); Ball, The City
of Unger, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 625, 630 (1987) ("We can unbolt the pieces of our contexts and replace
them one at a time."); cf. L. WITrTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY, supra note 11, T 343 ("We just can't
investigate everything. . . . If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.").
36. "At any given time we are largely the sum of our fundamental practices. But we are also the
permanent possibility of revising them." PASSION, supra note 6, at 41 (emphasis in original); FALSE
NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 351 (same).
37. See, e.g., supra notes 29-36; RECONSTRUCTING, supra note 5, at 4 (constructing new form of
power discourse); SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 333 (constructing new form of liberal discourse);
SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 148 ("approach allows for a piece-by-piece reconstruction of social
frameworks."); Ackerman, Law, Economics, and the Problem of Legal Culture, 1986 DUKE L.J.




A theory of social meaning links Ackerman to Unger, Unger to Acker-
man. But an aspect of that theory still divides: plasticity. While Unger
exhorts us to "plastify" society by making its structures more easily trans-
formed, Ackerman counsels us to resist. The scope of this conflict is ex-
plored below.
A. Unger: Plasticity
Social structures, Unger suggests, differ in at least two ways: They dif-
fer, first, in the content of the social world they induce, and second, in the
ease with which they can be changed.3 Plasticity describes this latter di-
mension. A plastic society minimizes the difference between acting upon
and acting within a social structure,39 "soften[ing] the distinction between
quotidian revision within a context and revolutionary revision of the con-
text itself . ",40
The plasticity of a social structure, however, is not itself simply fixed or
given; plasticity too can be changed. "We can alter not only the content
but the quality of our routines, the sense in which they are routines at
all." 41 By creating structures that multiply the instruments of challenge,4"
social structures are transformed from rigid to plastic, expanding the op-
portunities to transcend and change formative contexts.4 Unger urges us
to act upon this possibility, transforming the rigid into the pliant."
38. Unger calls these dimensions "quality" and "content." See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3,
at 4, 14; PASSION, supra note 6, at 192; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 4, 21, 156, 199.
39. See PASSION, supra note 6, at 13 ("contrast between routine moves within a framework and
revolutionary struggle about it loses its force").
40. Weinrib, Enduring Passion (Book Review), 94 YALE L.J. 1825, 1826 (1985). "Quotidian"
describes the regular hectic sense of ordinary political conflict and change.
Plasticity does not by itself make a society unstable: "Rigidity is not stability, nor does the increased
transparency and revisability of our practices mean we will want constantly to revise them." FALSE
NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 280. To the contrary, Unger suggests, plasticity means each individual
revision is likely to be less dramatic than in a society where structural change has been less frequent.
"The more a structure of thought . . . provides for the occasions and instruments of its own revision,
the less you must choose between maintaining it and abandoning it for the sake of things it excludes."
PASSION, supra note 6, at 10.
41. PASSION, supra note 6, at 192; see also id. at 13 ("[T]he more congenial to permanent inno-
vation an institutional form . . . becomes, the more perfectly it exemplifies the modernist ideal of a
context so open to revision that the contrast between routine moves within a framework and revolu-
tionary struggle about it loses its force.").
42. See FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 87; PASSION, supra note 6, at 13, 192-93, 264.
43. CRITICAL, supra note 6, at 94.
44. Unger at times suggests that the political program of plasticity is implied and warranted by
the explanatory philosophy underlying his project. The philosophy or explanatory program is said to
"inspire[l" (SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 5), "go[] hand in hand" (id. at 6), "teach[]" (id.),
"logical[ly] or epistemological[ly] connect" (id. at 43), "lead directly" (id. at 3), have implications for
(id. at 6, 159; PASSION, supra note 6, at 12; FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 37), stand closely
connected (id. at 1, 19), "connect" (id. at 11), "secure" (id. at 12), "make[] room for" (id. at 253),
justify (id. at 341), and "impl[y]" (id. at 571) the political program. But at other times Unger hedges
on the link, claiming the theory "does not ... determine" (id. at 578), can be separated from (id. at
173, 305), and "does not depend upon" (id. at 253) the political program. Others have concluded the
political recommendations are not compelled by the explanatory philosophy. See Boyle, supra note 6,
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A number of independent grounds are offered for this injunction to
plastify. Of these, only one-the special power plasticity promises democ-
racy-is essential here.4
The promise of plasticity for democracy is this. By "diminishing the
gap between framework-preserving and framework-transforming con-
flict," 46 plastic structures are less entrenched, 4  more easily revised. "Less
entrenched and more revisable [structures] help us empower ourselves in-
dividually and collectively.' '8 The more empowered a society, the greater
the scope for democratic or collective action, and therefore, the greater its
capacity to affirm the ends of democratic government.49 Plasticity is pro-
moted, then, because it increases the capacity of a society to act
democratically.
Unger promotes plasticity, and a familiar interpretation suggests that
his patronage is unconditional.50 But before evaluating the scope of
Unger's passion for plasticity, first contrast it with Ackerman's resistance.
B. Ackerman: Dualism
Like Unger, Ackerman recognizes social action both upon and within
social structures,5 ' and would agree that a less entrenched, more plastic
society could more easily revise social structures. He would disagree, how-
ever, with the notion that the mere fact a society can more easily change
itself means that it can change itself more democratically.
It is this concern 5-that any change be democratic change-that leads
Ackerman to resist plasticity. Ackerman argues that plasticity, rather than
empowering a democracy, decreases democratic control.53 For unless citi-
at 1076; Dunn, Unger's Politics and the Appraisal of Possibility, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 732, 738 (1987);
Galston, False Universality: Infinite Personality and Finite Existence in Unger's Politics, 81 Nw.
U.L. REv. 751, 758 (1987); Hawthorne, Practical Reason and Social Democracy, 81 Nw. U.L. REv.
766, 772 (1987); Isenbergh, Why Law?, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1117, 1118 (1987) (reviewing
CRITICAL).
45. Unger offers two other grounds for plasticity, both more evolutionary in their underpinnings.
The first is tied to Unger's conception of personality. See PASSION, supra note 6, at 95-271. The
second is more pragmatic: Plasticity engenders progress, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 578, by
assuring the conditions for practical success, id. at 283; SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 5, 155,
empowering a people or culture to adjust to the changing conditions of existence. For a historical
analysis of the progress provided by plasticity, see PLASTICrrY, supra note 6.
46. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 362.
47. SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 154 ("The more entrenched a formative context, the
greater the number of intermediate steps that must be traversed before context-preserving routines
become context-transforming struggles.").
48. Id. at 5.
49. As will be seen below, the desire to empower democratic government is shared by Ackerman
and Unger. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at I ("My aim is to provide the materials for a
revised professional narrative which recognizes that the project of constitutional creation begun in
Philadelphia continues onward to the present day."); infra text accompanying notes 51-74.
50. See infra note 114.
51. See, e.g., RECONsTRucrING, supra note 5, at 54.
52. This is also a concern of others. See Ewald, supra note 6, at 733-53 (discussing suggestions of
fascism in Unger); Galston, supra note 44, at 759.
53. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1038. In Ackerman's terms, a plastic constitutional structure
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zens keep a constant watch on the "everything up for grabs,"54 at some
point factions,55 rather than democrats, will manipulate social power.56
This fear of faction leads Ackerman to insist upon (some) rigidity for the
constituting commitments of a democratic order.57
Ackerman's concern finds its clearest voice in his discussion of Ameri-
can democracy.58 Drawing heavily upon a dualist theory of democracy,
Ackerman distinguishes two kinds, or "tracks," of political action. The
first track is the practice of normal politics; ordinary political decisions are
made by representative institutions of government acting within existing
structures. The second track is constitutional politics, where extra-
ordinary decisions are made by popular bodies acting outside and upon
the structures of ordinary government.59 Nothing on the first track can
disrupt the second;60 action on the second track61 represents special mo-
ments of rare meaning, "when the American people do even more-when,
after sustained debate and struggle, they hammer out new principles to
guide public life."6 2
Dualism is a response to the democrat's desire to assure that changes in
the fundamental principles of a constitutional structure represent the will
of the people represented. Like Unger,61 Ackerman's dualism responds to
and builds upon a feature of the human condition: Citizens, dualism rec-
ognizes, ordinarily live for ends beyond the public good; each has her own
private life, to which she devotes the majority of her effort.64 The constitu-
would be "single-tracked"; a rigid structure "dual-tracked." See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying
text.
54. Sunstein, Routine and Revolution, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 869, 871 (1987).
55. "By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse
to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
56. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1022.
57. Id. at 1038.
Ackerman's resistance to plasticity is not so clearly pronounced in his other major works, such as
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE, supra note 5. But these works are distinct from the Storrs
Lectures, supra note 4, and DISCOVERING, supra note 5; the latter are disciplined more dearly by
principles of democracy rather than of liberalism.
58. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5; Ackerman, supra note 4.
59. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1039-44. The difference between these kinds of action trans-
lated into a difference in the value of each. See DISCOVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at 9.
60. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1039. But see PASSION, supra note 6, at 5 ("[Tlhe acts that
reproduce these contexts, in changing circumstances, generate an endless stream of petty conflicts that
may escalate at any moment into more fundamental, context-threatening disputes.").
61. Second track politics is, one hopes, characterized "by ... appeals to the common good, rati-
fied by a mobilized mass of American citizens expressing their assent through extraordinary institu-
tional forms." Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1022 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 1039; see also DISCoVERING, supra note 5, ch. 2 at 50 ("[T]he Constitution cannot be
understood without recognizing that Americans have, time and again, successfully repudiated large
chunks of their past, and transformed their higher law to express deep changes in their political
identities.").
63. See PASSION, supra note 6.
64. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1032 (describing world "inhabited by men and women who
gain their deepest satisfactions in activities far removed from the public forum.").
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tional democrat, therefore, cannot simply assume that public virtue"5 will
guide constitutional change, or that citizens will always focus their atten-
tion on the transformative process. Rather than assuming such attention,
she must devise structures which engage these private citizens, 66 assuring
their participation, and assuring that their participation voices "consid-
ered judgment.' 67 "[Constitutional politics] . . . should be permitted to
dominate the nation's life only during rare periods of heightened political
consciousness." e8
By raising obstacles to structural revision, dualism assures that second
track politics prevails only during times of heightened political conscious-
ness. These obstacles raise the stakes for action upon fundamental struc-
tures of government, forcing ordinary government to turn outside itself, to
the people, for constitutional change.69 This is the strategy of "differential
sacrifice."" By distinguishing ordinary political change from constitu-
tional change, and making the latter more difficult to effect, dualism cre-
ates a vocabulary through which challenges to constitutional structures
signal their own importance,71 and by so signaling, assure that any such
change has the attention of private citizens.
In this way dualism addresses the imperfect ability of a democracy to
assure that changes in its fundamental principles represent carefully delib-
erated and well understood transformations. All the well-known problems
of democratic politics, articulated from Madison72 through modern politi-
cal science,7 3 teach that not all change is representative change. These
65. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1031-33 (discussing dualism's economy of virtue).
66. See id. at 1032-43.
67. Id. at 1038. The requirement of deliberation is not unproblematic; it has been extensively
discussed by Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1689 (1984); Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
1129 (1986).
68. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1022. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403
(1819) (The people "acted upon [the Constitution] in the only manner in which they can act safely,
effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in Convention.").
69. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1051-57.
70. Id. at 1041. Differential sacrifice creates distinctions in meaning in much the same way that
the institution of marriage constitutes different degrees of personal commitment. Id. The institution of
marriage, like the institution of dualism, enables a stronger commitment than would otherwise exist.
As with ordinary conflict within a marriage, ordinary conflict within a dualistic democracy can con-
tinue without drawing into question basic commitment to constitutional principles. As in marriage,
when a challenge to constituting commitments is made, the challenge signals its own importance. As
with the threat of divorce, the threat of constitutional change signals a change of importance, and
engages the attention of its own citizens.
71. Cf. J. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTs 33-42 (1969) (describing constitutive rules, which create rather
than merely regulate behavior they govern).
72. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) (discussing dangers of legislative usurpations).
Unger as well is cognizant of the concerns of faction. See Simon, Unger's Brazilian Journalism, 81
Nw. U.L. REV. 832, 855 (1987) ("[The constitutional] task ...should be seen as laying ground
rules for a process of 'permanent innovation.' The critical precondition for such a process is prevent-
ing the possibility that any particular class or faction assumes dominant power.").
73. See generally M. OLSON, THE LoGIc OF COLLECTIVE ACTrON (1965). See also D. MAY-




lessons lead Ackerman to resist treating ordinary and extra-ordinary polit-
ics alike."4
III. CONNECTION
Unger and Ackerman disagree about whether plasticity should be en-
dorsed; but this disagreement rests upon a confusion, engendered by an
ambiguity within the meaning of transformation. Relying upon the under-
standing of social meaning discussed in Section I, this Section distin-
guishes between two notions of transformation. These notions relate dif-
ferently to questions of democratic control: Whether plasticity is advanced
should turn upon which sense of transformation is at issue.
A. Translation and Alteration
As discussed above, the meaning of a token is a function of the token
and its context. 5 As either token or context changes, meaning may
change." If meaning is to be preserved, then, either (a) the changed ele-
ment must be restored, or (b) the unchanged element must be trans-
formed. Between context and token, assume that the token is generally
more easily transformed. 7 Where the context has changed, and the mean-
ing of the token in the new context is different, then the meaning can be
preserved by changing the token.78
74. Cf. Dunn, supra note 44, at 735 (drawing similar conclusions to resist plasticity, especially in
"face of thermonuclear war").
75. See supra Section I.
76. Chief Justice Marshall made a similar point in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316, 414 (1819): "Such is the character of human language, that no word conveys to the mind, in all
situations, one single definite idea." (emphasis added).
77. The assumption is not required: A counter-example is provided by United States v. Klein, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). Earlier lower-court rulings had held a pardon by President Johnson
sufficient to show that a claimant was not a supporter of the Confederate rebellion. Congress at-
tempted to change the meaning of that token by altering the rules of decision under which a loyalty
oath and pardon were to be read. Under Congress' new rules, a pardon meant the claimant was a
supporter of the rebellion. By changing the interpretative context, but for the act of the Court, Con-
gress would have changed the meaning of the token of a pardon.
78. The change in the token can be a change in its words or in its application.
This does not imply that meaning can always be preserved. It is possible that the changes are such
that the meaning of the token in the old context can no longer survive in the new. Consider Wittgen-
stein's example:
'It is as if our concepts involved a scaffolding of facts.' That would presumably mean: If you
imagine certain facts otherwise, describe them otherwise, than the way they are, then you can
no longer imagine the application of certain concepts, because the rules for their application
have no analogue in the new circumstances. So what I am saying comes to this: A law is given
for human beings, and a jurisprudent may well be capable of drawing consequences for any
case that ordinarily comes his way; thus the law evidently has its use, makes sense. Neverthe-
less, its validity presupposes all sorts of things, and if the being that he is to judge is quite
deviant from ordinary human beings, then e.g. the decision whether he has done a deed with
evil intent will become not difficult but (simply) impossible.
L. WrrTGFNSTEIN, ZETEL, supra note 11, at 350. Justice Jackson made a similar point about the
modality of translation in Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States:
We doubt if any interpreter could intelligently translate the contents of a writing that deals
with the property concept, for the Indians did not have a word for it. People do not have words
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The following examples may help make this point clear.
A mime begs for dimes. A couple walks up, speaking English, and
hands her a dime. She raises a sign saying "thanks." The token is
"thanks;" the context includes the English-speaking couple handing her a
dime. Another couple walks up, speaking German, and they too hand her
a dime. Wanting to thank them as she thanked the couple before, she
raises a different sign: "Danke." The token is different because the con-
text is different as well. To do the same thing requires doing something
different.
The point applies more generally. A diplomat is sent by her prime min-
ister to offer another government "greetings." She is told to be polite; so
after her meal in Iraq,"9 she belches loudly. The next day, dining with the
British Monarch, she wants to do as she had done before-namely, be
polite. Therefore she bows graciously upon leaving. Once again, to do the
same thing requires doing something different.
Both examples rehearse the obvious. But the point is equally valid in a
less obvious context. A Workers' Compensation statute, written in 1901,
sets the compensation for an injured finger at $25. A worker injures her
finger; a court awards $25. In 1989, faced with another similar loss, the
court awards $2,500. It reasons as follows: To do the same thing in this
new context, it must award something other than $25. By awarding $25,
the meaning of the award would be changed-again, because the context
is so drastically different. The court, therefore, changes the token to com-
pensate for the change in context."
In each of these cases, the token is transformed to keep the meaning the
same-a process we can label translation. Where meaning is not pre-
served, either because of a change in the context or token, the transforma-
tion effects an alteration. Transformations, therefore, are not all alike:
Only some alter the meaning of the token transformed, while others trans-
late the old meaning into a new context.81
to fit ideas that have never occurred to them. Ownership meant no more to them than to roam
the land as a great common.
324 U.S. 335, 357 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). See also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14
(1985) (White, J.) (pointing to failure of translation); cf. B. WHORF, supra note 12, at 158 ("Certain
ideas born of our own time-concept . . . would be . . . impossible and devoid of meaning under
[another] conception .... ").
79. See D. HAWLEY, MANNERS AND CORREcT FORM IN THE MIDDLE EAST 102 (1984).
80. This is not intended as a conclusive argument for ignoring the statutory sum: Statutes raise
complicated issues far beyond the scope of this Note. For a complete discussion, including a similar
example, see G. CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATuTES 40, 65-68 (1982) (dis-
cussing problems of indexing in statutory interpretation).
81. The notion of translation is not new to law. Consider, for example, Justice Jackson's opinion
in Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
True, the task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights, conceived as part of
the pattern of liberal government in the eighteenth century, into concrete restraints on officials
dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one to disturb self-confidence. These
principles grew in soil which also produced a philosophy that the individual was the center of
society, that his liberty was attainable through mere absence of governmental restraints, and
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This distinction between translation and alteration is critical to ques-
tions of democratic control. For if democratic endorsement tracks meaning
rather than mere tokens or words, 2 then a transformation that preserves
the meaning of a democratically-endorsed token likewise preserves the
democratic endorsement, while a transformation that alters the meaning
destroys the endorsement.8 3
Only alteration, then, raises issues of democratic control; there is no
reason, on democratic grounds,8" to oppose either translation or the plas-
ticity that promotes translation. Translators can be plastic, and, since pre-
serving of democratic control, democrats should insist upon it.
Whether we should accept Unger's exhortation to plastify, therefore,
that government should be entrusted with few controls and only the mildest supervision over
men's affairs. We must transplant these rights to a soil in which the laissez-faire concept or
principle of non-interference has withered at least as to economic affairs, and social advance-
ments are increasingly sought through closer integration of society and through expanded and
strengthened governmental controls.
319 U.S. 624, 639-40 (1943). A similar notion motivated Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("We must consider public education in the light of its full develop-
ment and its present place in American life throughout the Nation."), and Justice Douglas in Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 255 (1964) (dissenting opinion) (because restaurants in modem context are
as essential to interstate travel as inns and carriers, same principles should apply). See also City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3269 (1985) ("Shifting cultural, political, and
social patterns at times come to make past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental principles
upon which American society rests. . . ."); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 49
(1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing cases "establish[ing] rules translating due process in the
welfare context"); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (denying that due process translates
into affirmative funding obligation); id. at 348 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming it does); School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 236 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (translation in context of
establishment clause cases); Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 829 (1968) (translation of due process
into context of hearsay rule); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U.L. REv. 204, 218-21 (1980) (discussing translation of cruel and unusual punishment clause and
death penalty); Gewirtz, Reverse Discrimination, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 24, 1988, at 13, 15 ("[A]
statute actually functions like an organism dropped into a broader sea of law, and it takes on colora-
tion from its ever-changing environment. Its meaning can be modified indirectly. . . perhaps by other
changes in the legal environment . . .).
Translation has not, however, been universally endorsed. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 393, 426 (1857) ("No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling,
in relation to this unfortunate race. . . should induce the court to give to the words of the Constitu-
tion a more liberal construction . . . . It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning
.... "). Chief Justice Taney ignores the possibility that the same words may give a different mean-
ing, a possibility central to this Note.
82. One could say that democratic endorsement tracks the token rather than its meaning. Social
choice models of legislation, viewing a statute as a bargain, envision such tracking. See generally
Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 167 (1988). Alternatively, one could
argue that democratic endorsement tracks the "truth" of democratic principles. However, if tokens are
properly translated, and if they originally represented the truth, then the translated token should
represent the truth as well.
83. The fact that the endorsement of a token is transmitted says nothing about whether the mean-
ing of the token still commands the support of a majority of the populace, which could very well have
changed its mind. This Note assumes that a democratically-derived endorsement remains until re-
moved, and that the mere shift in background conditions, requiring a translation, is not sufficient to
effect a removal. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discuss-
ing constitutions) ("Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed
the established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually . . ").
84. There may be institutional reasons to resist plasticity in translation, such as stare decisis, but
these are beyond the scope of this Note. See CALABRESI, supra note 80; Monaghan, Stare Decisis and
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLum. L. REv. 723 (1988).
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will turn upon the kind of transformation at issue-whether in context he
promotes translation or alteration of democratically endorsed meaning.
B. Unger's Rhetoric of Transformation
Social life, Unger suggests, can be described by models of association, 5
each comprised of "a group of ideals, . . . a set of practices that . ..
stand for these ideals in fact; and an area of social experience to which
the application of these principles remains confined.""6 Using the terms of
this Note, we can consider the area of social experience as the context, the
practices or institutions as tokens, and the ideals as the meanings of the
tokens within their context. A change in either the practice or the area of
social experience can result in a change in the meaning or ideals of the
model.
1. Unger's Rhetoric of Alteration
One kind of transformation urged by Unger is alteration: The practices
of one model of association are applied in an area of social experience
from which they were previously excluded, so as to change the ideals gov-
erning this area of social experience."' The practices of democracy-equal
franchise and majority voting, for example-are extended to the social ex-
perience of worker/management relations; the practices of the family are
applied in the context of community relations.8" In both cases, the purpose
of the application is to change the ideals within the new area of experi-
ence. When such applications succeed, the transformation is an alteration.
2. Unger's Rhetoric of Translation
However, the rhetoric of alteration is neither Unger's exclusive nor
dominant rhetoric of transformation. Transformative action can change ei-
ther the ideals or the practices, 9 but between the two, "attack[s] on the
ideals that inspire . . . a particular view of life" are the rarest.90 More
often attacks are made upon the coherence of the practices of the model of
85. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 101 ("Every extended practice of application of law de-
mands recourse to tacit models of human association. The lawyer clears up the ambiguities of legal
materials by referring to the basic principles that help organize and elucidate whole bodies of law.").
86. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
87. "[W]hat began as a mere extension of familiar ideals into untried territory forces us in the end
to refine and revise the ideal conceptions of human associations with which we had started." FALSE
NEcEssiTy, supra note 3, at 105.
88. See, e.g., id. at 228 (discussing institutional changes to market economy to bring about petty
commodity production).
89. "In each instance, the available options appeared to combine an abstract, indeterminate
idea-of democratic rule, market decentralization, or technical coordination-with a concrete set of
institutions that developed the idea in some directions rather than in others." SOCIAL THEORY, supra
note 6, at 48.
90. FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 104.
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association, for it is here that "[m]ore often, the fit . . . comes apart."91
Where once the ideals and the practices cohered, they no longer do, and
unless either the ideals or the practices are transformed, the pre-existing
meaning will be lost.92 "[T]he perpetuation of [the practice] restrains the
realization of its defining ideals . . . ."" A "partial adjustment[]"94 is
required, responding to "changes in circumstances"' 9 5 to restore the model
to its original purpose.
This is no longer the rhetoric of alteration. Indeed, the process Unger
describes here is a paradigmatic example of translation. A token (here an
institution or practice) is changed to adjust for a change in the context
(changed circumstances) so as to maintain its meaning (ideals). The trans-
formation effects a translation: Rather than altering, translation preserves
meaning from one context to another. To the extent this occurs "more
often," to the extent Unger argues for "partial adjustments," and to the
extent such partiality is required for stability," Unger's transformations
manifest the rhetoric of translation. 97
Two very different rhetorics, then, animate Unger's project. Only the
rhetoric of alteration raises the issues of democratic control motivating
Ackerman's project of dualism. To the extent Unger argues for plasticity
in translation, his rhetoric is helpful,98 but not wildly controversial.99 Any
dispute over plasticity, then, will lie in the domain of transformations that
alter rather than translate.
91. Id. at 105.
92. Cf Sunstein, supra note 54, at 883-84 (intentions of a practice will not be met unless institu-
tions changed).
93. FALSE NEcEssrrY, supra note 3, at 27.
94. Id. at 280.
95. Id. at 552; see also PLASTscrrv, supra note 6, at 153 (defining plasticity as "the facility with
which work relations among people. . . can be constantly shifted in order to suit changing circum-
stances, resources and intentions.") (emphasis added).
Unger explicitly notes the possibility of changes in the formative context being translations, or
"functional equivalents." FALSE NECEssrrY, supra note 3, at 65. The point, however, is left
undeveloped.
96. The plastic society, Unger suggests, is stable. FALSE NEcESSrrY, supra note 3, at 280 ("[L]ess
entrenched structures are by definition more open to revision . . . [b]ut they are not therefore more
unstable . . . ."). Instability is risked only when cultures divide over abstract ideals; when the "con-
flicting partisan visions get translated into the detailed schemes of collective life," id. at 280, however,
the risk of wildly divergent views is erased.
97. Many of the ideas Unger articulates in describing a constitutional democracy are understand-
able as translations of 18th Century counterparts into 20th Century circumstances. See FALSE NECES-
srrY, supra note 3, at 456-57 (discussing principles governing conflict of powers); id. at 227 ("The
constitutional techniques for limiting government power must not be restricted to the armory of eight-
eenth-century institutional devices that control government only by disabling it from ambitious re-
form."); id. at 449 (increased Madisonian conflict necessary to translate checks and balances to mod-
ern activist state.).
98. Unger's critique of "false necessity," see supra text accompanying notes 33-35, as an expla-
nation of the rigidity in democratic politics is particularly useful. To the extent this rigidity rests upon
"superstition," SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 4, and this superstition explains an unwillingness to
translate, the critique is useful even to one who wants no alteration of existing structures at all. Cf
FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 305 ("It is true that you do not need to share an allegiance to the
radical project in order to evaluate or even accept these descriptive and explanatory ideas.").
99. See supra note 81.
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C. Ackerman's Rhetorics of Transformation
Like Unger, Ackerman distinguishes alteration from translation. But
only in the context of alteration does Ackerman resist plasticity. In the
context of translation, specifically constitutional interpretation, Ackerman
both endorses and relies upon plasticity. Sketching these two rhetorics in
Ackerman will reveal the distance remaining between Ackerman and
Unger.
1. Ackerman's Rhetoric of Alteration
Ackerman focuses upon three "moments" of constitutional change in
American political history, each a fundamental alteration in constitutional
meaning. The first moment, the founding of the Constitution, involved a
fundamental change in the ideal of sovereignty;' 00 the second, after the
Civil War, a change in the ideal of equality and national government;' 0'
and the third, during the New Deal, establishment of the "legitimacy of
the activist welfare state."'0 2 In each case, the transformations involved a
change in the character of the Constitution. Each was a paradigmatic ex-
ample of alteration rather than translation.
These changes were effected only after great political struggle; struggles
which, given the generally perceived desirability of each, may seem regret-
table. Ackerman, however, applauds the structures that required the
struggle, for the act of surmounting the barriers to constitutional change
gave special meaning to the resulting structures.' The dualistic barriers
imposed on democracy served democratic ends-rigidity to assure that any
change has the attention and endorsement of the people.
2. Ackerman's Rhetoric of Translation
For the same reason that dualism resists plasticity in alteration, dualism
embraces translation. In its aim to give full effect to constitutional mean-
ing, dualism requires an ongoing process of interpretative synthesis.'04
This exercise of hermeneutic understanding necessarily incorporates the
notion of translation sketched above.'05 Dualism requires translation
where translation preserves democratic meaning.
100. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787 430-564 (1969);
Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1439-51 (1987).
101. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1065-69.
102. Id. at 1053. See also id. at 1056 ("[Jludges recognized that a new constitutional principle
had indeed been ratified") (emphasis added).
103. The high cost to second track lawmaking constitutes its own worth: "If it were cheap and
easy for higher lawmaking to succeed, we would be debasing the remarkable collective achievement
involved when millions of Americans do manage . . . to engage in an act of self-government ... "
Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1043.
104. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1071-72.
105. See Brest, supra note 81, at 218 (discussing the "hermeneutical problems" of the interpreter,
linking hermeneutics and translation by pointing to need to "'translate' the adopters' concepts and
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The very structure of Ackerman's articulation of dualism, moreover,
reveals this reliance on translation. To establish the legitimacy of the sub-
stantive constitutional changes effected in each constitutional moment,
Ackerman must defend the problematic procedures by which the Constitu-
tion was altered.1" 6 For in none of the three moments was the Constitu-
tion amended by formalistically corYect constitutional means. 107 Yet de-
spite these formal failings, these amendments bear the full weight of
constitutional law. How can such failings be ignored?
Note that Article V itself is a meaning token. An amendment, therefore,
can fall outside the specific terms of Article V, but remain within its
meaning."' This possibility can be relied upon in Ackerman's claim that
the processes through which the Constitution was amended in the Civil
War and New Deal eras were "functional[ly] similar[]"' 0 9 to the process
imagined by Article V: Each process, though different, had the same
meaning. A change in constitutional circumstances (changes of context)
required a change in the application of Article V (the token) to maintain
the meaning of the Article V procedure." 0
It is irrelevant whether one agrees with Ackerman's conception of the
amending processes, or with his view that either moment proceeded under
a functional equivalent to Article V. What is important here is that Ack-
erman has acknowledged changes in the token of Article V so as to pre-
serve its meaning. Despite the strictures of dualist democracy, Ackerman
has allowed a translation of Article V where translation preserved Article
V's meaning.
D. Translation, Alteration, and Plasticity
We are now able to reassess the differences between Ackerman and
Unger. By distinguishing between the rhetorics of alteration and transla-
tion, substantial grounds for agreement between Ackerman and Unger are
revealed.
1. Plasticity and Translation
On democratic grounds, Ackerman resists plasticity. But such resistance
should not extend to transformations that translate. Translation transmits
intentions into our time"); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781,
798-804 (1983) (discussing hermeneutic practice of interpretation).
106. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1051-72.
107. The founding was "plainly illegal" under the Articles of Confederation, Ackerman, supra
note 4, at 1058; but see Amar, supra note 3, at 1047-48; the Civil War amendments violated the
terms of Article V, Ackerman, supra note 4, 1065-69; and the New Deal was accomplished wholly
outside the literal terms of Article V, id. at 1069.
108. And conversely, an amendment could fall within the precise terms of Article V, but outside
its meaning.
109. DISCOVERING, supra note 5, ch. 1 at 30.
110. Id., ch. 1 at 25.
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the democratic endorsement of the tokens it transforms,"' and therefore
cannot be rejected on democratic grounds."'
Accordingly, Ackerman does not resist translations of Article V, even
though the transformation of the amending procedure was not itself demo-
cratically-endorsed. More generally, neither should he resist transforma-
tions that translate, or structures that foster such translation.
2. Plasticity and Alteration
Plasticity in alteration raises other concerns; among them Ackerman's
apprehensions for democratic control. A democracy must assure that
changes reflect a democratic will; plasticity's failure to provide such an
assurance.1 . drives Ackerman to promote dualism. Ackerman apparently
conditions plasticity, while Unger apparently does not." 4
If the dispute between Ackerman and Unger distills to a dispute over
the reach of plasticity in alteration, then it is not clear that wide disagree-
ment remains. Unger's injunction to plastify is never unconditional."'
Plasticity is limited by pragmatic, prudential concerns. One reading of
these concerns might well support dualism's limitations in the context of
constitutional commitments.
Unger offers two express limitations on plasticity. One limitation is
poverty; where poverty exists, plasticity may be deferred." 6 But poverty is
a wider concept than mere economic deprivation, and it is an analogous
poverty-political poverty-that leads Ackerman to dualism. Like eco-
nomic poverty, political poverty diverts democrats from the affairs of the
state. A politically impoverished nation must erect mechanisms to assure
that any fundamental change gains the attention of the people. Whatever
its cause, poverty, whether economic or political, must limit the scope of
plasticity in alteration.
Unger's second limit upon plasticity, however, in the realm of personal
111. See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
112. Although again, there may be other institutional grounds for limiting plasticity, such as stare
decisis. See supra note 84.
113. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 870, 892. But see FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 3, at 369
("Governmental power must not be exclusively and permanently exercised by such a sector of the
population nor used for its primary benefit.").
114. For the best examples of this interpretation, see Ewald, supra note 6, at 738 ("Just as a
series of one-night stands does not add up to a worthwhile personal relationship . . . so a series of
disruptions by the Bureau of Liquification does not add up to a worthwhile scheme of human associa-
tion."); Herzog, Rummaging Through the Emperor's Wardrobe, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1434, 1444
(1988) ("Unger does seem bent on change for its own sake.") (reviewing POLITICS); Holmes, The
Professor of Smashing: The preposterous political romanticism of Roberto Unger, NEW REPUBLIC,
Oct. 19, 1987, at 30, 31 ("Unger still hopes to do for the daylight what Sade did for the night.")
(reviewing same); Yack, Towards a Free Marketplace of Social Institutions, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1961, 1976-77 (1988) ("[They can engage in [constructive] ... tasks only if they are willing to
abandon Unger's futile pursuit of non-constraining constraints.") (reviewing same).
115. See, e.g., FALSE NEcESsrry, supra note 3, at 461 ("There are limits to the extent to which
any particular set of institutional arrangements can embody a principle of permanent self-revision.").
116. SOCIAL THEORY, supra note 6, at 210.
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relations, is even more illuminating. Consider Unger's treatment of
marriage:
Even within the realm of personal encounter, the commitment to this
repeated hazard of self-transformation does not always imply a will-
ingness to destabilize all attachments. It all depends. Thus, for ex-
ample, one reason to view a marriage as indissoluble is that this
commitment enables husband and wife to accept and experience con-
flict without fearing every disagreement as a possible cause of
separation.1 7
Here Unger opens wide the possible grounds for limits on plasticity. As in
the realm of personal relations, precommitment in the political realm can
be enabling"" rather than restrictive. Depending upon what "it all de-
pends" on, plasticity in constitutional politics could be similarly restricted:
For the same reasons plasticity should be limited in the domain of consti-
tuting personal commitments, so, too, could it be limited in the domain of
constituting social or political commitments.
Both limits on plasticity suggested by Unger, then, arguably support, in
the context of constitutional politics, the limits of dualism suggested by
Ackerman.
CONCLUSION
Many have read Unger's injunction to plastify as an unequivocal com-
mand to radical and constant revolution in every domain of social experi-
ence."' This Note has argued that it is not: The transformation that plas-
ticity brings does not inevitably imply a change in social or political
meaning, nor is the injunction to plastify unlimited. Transformations ei-
ther alter or preserve the meaning of a democratic token, and even where
transformation alters, Unger offers us grounds for limiting the scope of
plasticity.
The apparent gulf, then, between Ackerman and Unger has been
117. PASSION, supra note 6, at 267 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Unger's limitation on
plasticity in marriage, see Holmes, supra note 114, at 321; Note, Roberto Unger's Theory of Person-
ality, Law and Society, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 423, 444 (1986). Compare Unger's limitation with Acker-
man's, supra note 70. For an example of the tendency to ignore Unger's discussion of "enabling"
commitment, see Herzog, supra note 114, at 1442 (claiming Unger always views institutions as con-
straining, "never enabling").
118. Cf Galston, supra note 44, at 762 ("some revision-resisting contexts actually liberate us.");
Sunstein, supra note 54, at 889-90 (discussing precommitment as facilitative).
119. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 54, at 871 ("For Unger, the overriding purpose of a revised
system of institutional arrangements is to ensure that fundamental issues should be continually 'up for
grabs.' The system should be structured to facilitate its frequent and fundamental revision. The dis-
tinction between routine and revolution should be eliminated; checks and balances should disappear.
Massive transformations should be easy to accomplish."); id. at 881 ("The 'empowered democracy'
.. . is a departure from all the traditional understandings."); Holmes, supra note 114, at 31 (viewing
Unger as context-smashing for its own sake); Isenbergh, supra note 44, at 1119 ("It is a defining
element of radical movements to tear down the world before building it anew.").
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crossed. On democratic grounds, Ackerman has no reason to refuse plas-
ticity in translation; on grounds internal to his own argument, Unger may
have reason to limit plasticity in alteration in the constitutional context.
By distinguishing the sense of transformation that is the focus of each, the
gap dividing them has been diminished, even if not completely closed.
Differences in attitude remain, and these differences are not easily cata-
logued. Rather than attempting such an index, this Note offers a different
reading of the radical rhetoric of the intellectual father of Critical Legal
Studies. This reading suggests not only that there is more to plasticity
than may at first appear, but also that plasticity is less radical than is so
often claimed. Plasticity may help preserve constitutional meaning in the
face of contextual change, and, when employed to effect constitutional
change, nothing requires that it be unlimited.
In this way, plasticity may be less radical than some would suggest; but
in speaking less radically, it perhaps says something more.
